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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to develop an epistemology of scientific models in scientific research 
practices, and to show that disciplinary perspectives have crucial role in such an epistemology. A 
transcendental (Kantian) approach is taken, aimed at explanations of the kinds of questions relevant 
to the intended epistemology, such as “How is it possible that models provide knowledge about 
aspects of reality?” The approach is also pragmatic in the sense that the questions and explanations 
must be adequate and relevant to concrete scientific practice.  
First it is explained why the idea of models as representations in terms of similarity or isomorphism 
between a model and its target is too limited as a basis for this epistemology. An important finding is 
that the target-phenomenon is usually not something that can be observed in a straightforward 
manner, but requires both characterization in terms of measurable variables and subsumption under 
(scientific) concepts. 
The loss of this basis leads to a number of issues, such as: how can models be interpreted as 
representations if models also include conceptually meaningful linguistic content; how can 
researchers identify non-observable real-world target-phenomena that are then represented in the 
model; how do models enable inferential reasoning in performing epistemic tasks by researchers; 
and, how to justify scientific models. My proposal is to deal with these issues by analyzing how 
models are constructed, rather than by looking at ready-made models.  
Based on this analysis, I claim that the identification of phenomena and the construction of scientific 
models is guided and also confined by the disciplinary perspective within which researchers in a 
scientific discipline have learned to work. I propose a Kuhnian framework by which the disciplinary 
perspective can be systematically articulated.  
Finally, I argue that harmful forms of subjectivism, due to the loss of the belief that models 
objectively represent aspects of reality, can be overcome by making the disciplinary perspective(s) in 
a research project explicit, thereby enabling its critical assessment, for which the proposed Kuhnian 
framework provides a tool. 
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1. Introduction 
This article aims at developing an epistemology of scientific models. The focus is on empirical and 
experimental research practices that work in the context of concrete societal or (socio-)technological 
challenges.1 I will argue that the role of disciplinary perspectives is crucial to an adequate 
epistemology of scientific models in these practices.  
Traditional philosophy of science focused of the role of models in testing or justifying abstract 
theories, which has been systematically worked out in the semantic view of theories. I will explicate 
this as an epistemology of models, and use this as a point of reference for developing an 
epistemology of scientific models that does more justice to their roles in scientific research practices. 
The adjective 'scientific' is to emphasize that the intended epistemology is about models that play an 
independent epistemic role, rather than just serving in the justification of theories. I will argue that 
an epistemology of scientific models in research practices involves a number of interrelated 
questions that require philosophical clarification. It begins with the basic question: “What is a 
scientific model?” In the philosophy of science, a common answer is that a model is a representation 
of a real-world target-system or phenomenon.2, 3 This leads to the next question: “What is meant by 
the idea that models represent a target-phenomenon?” When oriented at scientific practice and the 
epistemic uses of models, an epistemology of scientific models must also address: “How is it possible 
that humans gain knowledge about aspects of reality by scientific models?” This points at a more 
specific question: “How is it possible that scientific models allow for epistemic tasks and inferential 
reasoning by humans?” Furthermore, assuming that scientific models are used for performing 
epistemic tasks raises the question: “How are scientific models justified?” It will appear that also the 
notion of ‘the target-phenomena represented by the model’ requires attention, in particular when 
scientific models represent target-phenomena that are not observable in a straight-forward manner. 
This introduces two additional questions: “What is a phenomenon?” and “How is it possible that 
models represent non-observable target-phenomena?” Having addressed these questions in the first 
part of this article, in the second part I will argue that disciplinary perspectives form an inherent part 
of the proposed epistemology of scientific models. Here, I will propose a Kuhnian framework that 
enables to systematically articulate and critically evaluate the disciplinary perspective(s) of 
researchers working in research projects. 
In developing an epistemology of scientific models, I adopt a transcendental (Kantian) and pragmatic 
approach. In this approach the format of asking philosophical questions is: “How is it possible that 
(for example, models provide knowledge about aspects of reality)?” In other words, “What must be 
presupposed about scientific practices, the character of epistemic entities (e.g., models), and human 
cognition to explain that this is possible?” A transcendental approach thus seeks explanations for the 
“How is it possible …?” questions such as those raised above. Conversely, the “What is …?” questions 
 
1 My focus on scientific practice includes a normative stance in the sense that philosophical accounts must be 
adequate and relevant for (specific types of) scientific practice. 
 
2 See Frigg & Hartmann (2018) and Frigg & Nguyen (2016b) for comprehensive overviews. 
 
3 Alternatively, philosophers have proposed that models are fictions (e.g., Suárez, ed., 2009). In the present 
article, I will focus on the idea that models are representations. 
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are mostly secondary in the sense of being based on these explanations.4 The pragmatic part of my 
approach is that the questions and explanations must be adequate and relevant to concrete scientific 
practice.  
An overview of the structure and conclusions of this article can be found in Section 7. 
 
2. The semantic view: Models as representations of theories 
What are models in the semantic view of theories? 
This section aims to show that the semantic view offers a straightforward account of the 
representational relationship between scientific models and real-world target-phenomena, but next, 
that this account is too limited as an epistemology of scientific models in scientific research practices. 
In the semantic view, the role assigned to models is subordinate to the question of how abstract 
theories can be tested. Testing a theory involves combining a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
(see, Figure 1 in Giere 2010). Top-down, models of imaginary phenomena or systems (for example 
the ideal harmonic oscillator) are (mathematically) derived from the abstract theory (e.g., axiomatic 
systems such as Newton’s laws of motion). Giere calls them representational models. These 
representational models are sometimes called representations of the theory but are also referred to 
as instantiations of the theory (also see Giere, 1999, 167-8). Concurrently, these models represent 
the imaginary phenomenon. 
Here I introduce the notion of imaginary phenomena to make a clear distinction with the real-world 
phenomenon, for example, real-world oscillations. It is worth stressing that the philosophical focus of 
the semantic view is not primarily on the modeling of a ‘real-world’ phenomena. Nevertheless, the 
purpose of the semantic view to explain how theories are tested does require to connect between 
the imagined phenomenon and a real-world target-phenomenon. 
The model derived from the abstract theory usually consists of a set of mathematical equations, 
which can be plotted in graphs by making calculations that predict model-outcomes. Bottom-up, data 
are generated through real-world experiments, for example, experiments that generate real 
oscillations and produce data by measuring location or angle as a function of time. On the basis of 
these experimentally generated data-sets of the real-world phenomenon, so-called data-models are 
generated by also using theoretical knowledge about the experimental technologies and statistical 
procedures on ‘raw’ data. Data-models represent the real-world target-phenomenon. These data-
models can also be plotted in graphs. Subsequently, the test of the theory consists of comparing 
(e.g., visually) the plotted (non-linguistic) structures that are based ‘top-down’ on the 
representational model that represents the imaginary phenomenon under conditions occurring in 
 
4 A Kantian (transcendental) approach can be compared with approaches in science that aim at explanations. In 
the natural sciences these explanations cannot be ‘read’ from nature. Therefore, researchers ask what must be 
presupposed about the (purported) underlying (non-observable) structure of nature to explain observable 
events. In a similar way, a transcendental approach in philosophy starts from asking what must be presupposed 
about human cognition and their epistemic strategies to explain epistemic results. Researchers can only assess 
an explanations for its value to the intended (epistemic or pragmatic) uses. Hence, the suggested similarity 
between approaches in the natural sciences to look for explanations, on the one hand, and transcendental 
approaches in philosophy, on the other, agrees to an anti-realist epistemology according to which humans are 
‘in principle’ unable to determine whether the proposed explanation is literally true. This anti-realist (and anti-
metaphysical) assumption about both science and philosophy guides my approach throughout the present 
study. 
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the experiments, and ‘bottom-up’ on the plotted data-model that represents the real-world 
phenomenon at the experimental conditions.5 Based on this methodology of comparing theoretically 
predicted and experimentally generated (non-linguistic) structures, scientists decide whether the 
theory meets epistemic criteria such as empirical adequacy (Van Fraassen, 1980, 2008).  
It is important to note that the semantic view provides an epistemology of abstract theories that 
draws on the possibility to objectively compare structures. Apparently, one structure can be called 
the representation of another structure because the semantic relationship between them is 
(partially) isomorphic. This approach to testing theories only works when using non-linguistic 
entities.6 My aim is not to claim that the semantic view is philosophically unproblematic, but to 
emphasize that its plausibility is based on the premise of comparable relationships between 
structures, which is evaluated in terms of semantic notions such as ‘(partial)-isomorphism,’ 
‘similarity,’ ‘resemblance,’ ‘likeness,’ or ‘mapping.’  
 
How are scientific models justified? 
An epistemology of scientific models7 requires an explanation of how these models are justified or 
evaluated, which means that it must be assessed whether they are correct about the real-world 
target-phenomenon. First, what can we learn from the semantic view about testing scientific 
models?  
The semantic view makes it clear that testing occurs by comparing theoretically generated models 
(i.e., non-linguistic structures representing the theory) with empirically grounded structures (i.e., 
non-linguistic structures representing the real-world target-phenomenon). Hence, on the one hand, 
it is the model-outcomes generated by the non-linguistic structure that is derived from the theory to 
represent the imaginary phenomenon (e.g., the imaginary harmonic oscillator) at the physical 
conditions in the experimental set-up, and on the other hand, the data-model generated by an 
experimental set-up that somehow mimics the imaginary phenomenon. Comparison requires that 
researchers manage to physically generate the imaginary phenomenon by means of the 
experimental set-up. Crucially, this involves that the variables that characterize the imaginary 
phenomenon in the model are the same as the measurable variables in the experimental set-up. 
The asset of the semantic view is that comparison between the scientific model and the real-world 
target-phenomenon merely occurs between (non-linguistic) structures that only make use of the 
measurable variables (e.g., time, location, angle, length, mass). Hence, the scientific model 
 
5  Also see Suppe 1989 for a comprehensive explanation of the Semantic View of Theories. 
 
6 More specifically, a number of representational relationships play a role in this account of testing abstract 
theories: (a) the representational model representing the abstract theory; (b) the representational model 
representing the imaginary phenomenon; (c) the real-world phenomenon generated in the experimental set-up 
representing the imaginary phenomenon, vice versa; (d) the raw data representing the real-world phenomena; 
and (e) the data-model representing the raw data. Each of the sentences (a)-(e) has the form “A represents B.” 
Eventually, the test of the theory is by comparison between two structures: (f) the representational model is 
partially isomorphic or structurally similar to the data-model, having the form “A is / is not partially isomorphic 
(or structurally similar) to B.” When assuming that the representational relationships (a-e) are (partial) 
isomorphic relationships between structures, and also, that isomorphic relationships are transitive (i.e., if 
structure A is isomorphic to structure B, and B is isomorphic to C, then A is also isomorphic to C), then this way 
of reasoning to test or justify the abstract theory is sound.  
 
7 Instead of representational model (as in the semantic view), I will use the notion scientific model. 
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represents the imagined phenomenon not ‘literally’ as a picture or photograph, but in terms of a set 
of measurable variables, while the real-world phenomenon is represented in terms of the same set 
of measurable variables. Moreover, in the case of non-observable phenomena, the comparison is 
‘only’ made between model-outcomes and data-models — i.e., between a structure generated by the 
scientific model at conditions in the experimental set-up, on the one hand, and data-models derived 
from data measured in an experimental set-up, on the other hand. There is no 'direct' comparison 
between the scientific model and the purported non-observable real-world phenomenon.8 
 
3. Models as representations of real-world phenomena 
Models as mediators and autonomous agents 
Crucial to the semantic view of theories is the idea that scientific models are (mathematically) 
derived from abstract scientific theories. In that capacity, scientific models are used to justify or test 
the abstract theory. In the renowned collection Models as Mediators, Morrison & Morgan (eds. 
1999) defend a more extended view of models in science.9 Their goal is “to clarify at least some of 
the ways in which models can act as autonomous mediators in the sciences and to uncover the 
means by which they function as a source of knowledge” (ibid, 8). They introduce the notion of 
models as mediating instruments, and argue that “if models are to play an autonomous role allowing 
them to mediate between our theories and the world, and allowing us to learn about one or the 
other, they require such partial independence” (ibid, 17). Clearly, their ideas are still close to the 
semantic view when they assume that “models represent either aspects of our theories, or aspects of 
our world, or more typically aspects of both at once, … [T]he model represents, in its details, both the 
theory and a real world pendulum” (ibid, 32). At the same time, they depart from the semantic view 
when claiming that the model “functions as an autonomous instrument which allows us to make the 
correct calculations for measurements to find out a particular piece of information about the world” 
(ibid, 32).  
Likewise, Morrison (1999) assumes that models rather than abstract theory represent and explain 
the behavior of physical systems. She assumes that models are derived from theories, which accords 
with the semantic view, but she expands on it by defending that models do so in a way that makes 
them autonomous agents in the production of scientific knowledge. She explains this idea by an 
example showing that the model of the boundary layer in fluid mechanics cannot be mathematically 
derived from the Navier-Stokes equations alone, but also involves phenomenological descriptions 
and conceptual understanding of viscous flows. Thus, Morrison's analysis shows the crucial role of 
descriptions and conceptual content in constructing scientific models that cannot be derived from 
abstract theory only. Therefore, an epistemology of scientific models must take into account the role 
of linguistic and conceptual content. Yet, this implies that we lose the aforementioned benefits of the 
semantic view that are based on the assumption that models are non-linguistic entities. 
In summary, the idea of models as mediators shows that the semantic view gives a very limited view 
on the role of models in scientific practice. First, not all models are derived from abstract theories. 
 
8 My emphasis on the crucial role of measurements and experimentation in generating representations that 
allow for comparison agrees with Van Fraassen’s (2008): “it is not only to our understanding of theories and 
their models that representation is relevant. The achievement of theoretical representation is mediated by 
measurement and experimentation, in the course of which many forms of representation are involved as well,” 
(ibid, 2, my emphasis).  
 
9 See Frigg & Hartman (2018) for a comprehensive overview of philosophical discussions on models in science. 
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Secondly, testing abstract theory is not the only epistemic function of models, but also have 
independent (autonomous) epistemic roles in science. This means that models themselves are 
sources of knowledge in the sense that models can be used to generate knowledge about the real-
world target-phenomenon. Thirdly, models also entail linguistic (conceptually meaningful epistemic) 
content. 
 
How do scientific models represent non-observable target-phenomena? 
The epistemology of scientific models according to the presented interpretation of the semantic view 
involves that, in the case of non-observable phenomena, the representational relationship exists only 
between model-outcomes and data-models. More specifically, there is only a representational 
relationship between the non-linguistic outcomes of the scientific model calculated at conditions in 
the experimental set-up, and data-models derived from data measured in an experimental set-up 
that supposedly generates or investigates the purported non-observable phenomenon. On this 
account, there is not a ‘direct’ representational relationship in terms of isomorphism or similarity 
between the scientific model and the purported non-observable phenomenon. 
However, current accounts of scientific models do not seem to adopt this very restricted sense in 
which the notions ‘representation,’ and ‘similarity,’ etc. are to be understood. To the contrary, 
authors often suggest that models are a more or less literal (although idealized), picture-like 
representations of (non-observable) real-world phenomena. This is illustrated, for instance, in these 
quotes by Giere (2002): “Models are objects that can be used to represent reality by exhibiting a 
designated similarity to physical objects … My prototype for a model is a standard road map. This is a 
physical object (usually made of paper) that I would say represents a terrain in virtue of quite specific 
spatial similarities. I move on to scale models, such as Watson’s original physical model of DNA.” 
These kinds of metaphors are intelligible when the model represents observable phenomena (e.g., as 
in graphic art, or in design), or when the representation can be understood as resulting from a 
specific type of mapping (e.g., 3D to 2D). In these cases, it is possible for knowledgeable researchers 
to compare the model with the target-phenomenon. But such a comparison is hard to imagine when 
it comes to non-observable phenomena (e.g., as in the model of DNA). I therefore tend to agree with 
Van Fraassen (2008), who argues that if the meaning of representation involves the idea of likeness 
or similarity, this can only concern observable phenomena (e.g., ibid, 87). Yet, I disagree with Van 
Fraassen that phenomena are observable by definition. It is common practice in scientific research to 
refer to all kinds of non-observable phenomena.  
An epistemology of scientific models should therefor include a comprehensible explanation of the 
representational relationship between scientific models and non-observable real-world target-
phenomena. This forces us to specify what we mean by phenomena. In particular, how do we identify 
and specify the target-phenomenon represented in the model? Is the target-phenomenon 
represented in the model epistemically independent of the model? How does the target-phenomena 
become known to us? In the case on non-observable phenomena, does this not already involve a 
scientific model of the phenomenon? All this implies that an epistemology of scientific models also 
requires an epistemology of phenomena. 
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4. An epistemology of observable and unobservable target-phenomena 
What is a phenomenon? 
Although there is an extensive literature on phenomena, the question “what is a phenomenon?” is 
not often discussed in the literature on models.10 Therefore, the way in which the concept of 
phenomenon is used needs clarification. Let us first look at some examples. Well-known historical 
examples of observable phenomena discovered by scientists are: the orbit of the Moon, the patterns 
formed in iron filings on paper covering a magnet, the piezo-electric effect, and the emission and 
absorption spectra in heated hydrogen gas. Commonly, the observed phenomena are represented by 
drawings or tables or graphs.11 In the semantic view, these types of representations are called data 
or data-models. However, this suggests that the phenomena just described can be reduced to a 
pattern in data. It suggests that ‘observed phenomena’ are the observed patterns (or structures) that 
occur in nature or are generated in experimental setups. But in this manner, we seem to lose 
essential information. Surely, this account of observable phenomena is adequate to the project of 
the semantic view. But it does not fully cover the roles of phenomena and their modelling in concrete 
scientific practices. So, can we come up with an account that is more adequate about these roles? 
In this section, I aim for an epistemology of phenomena that is adequate with regard to experimental 
research and scientific modelling practices. First I will analyze various ideas within the philosophy of 
science about phenomena.12 Next, I will outline an account that I find plausible for solving the various 
conceptual and epistemological issues that emerge in this analysis. Finally, I will explain in Section 5 
how this account of phenomena fits with the ideas proposed in this article about how models are 
constructed within disciplinary perspectives. 
 
What are phenomena in the semantic view? 
I take Van Fraassen as a representative of the interpretation of the semantic view that I endorse. In 
accordance with his empiricist stance, he assumes that the task of science is to represent the 
observable phenomena, which he refers to as ‘to save the phenomena’ (Van Fraassen, 2008, 86). This 
take on the matter implies that not the scientific model, but the model-outcome represents the 
observable phenomenon. As said, the model-outcome is expected to be (partially) isomorphic to the 
observed phenomenon at conditions in the experimental setup. It is in this very manner that the 
model, when correct, represents the observed phenomenon. Clearly, this agrees with how the 
semantic view explains representational relationships in testing theories. As outline above, observed 
phenomena in turn, are mere patterns or structures in measured data, which are represented by 
drawings or tables or graphs, and called data or data-models. 
But what does this mean for the content of the scientific model? According to Van Fraassen, “A 
model often contains much that does not correspond to any observable feature in the domain. Then, 
from an empiricist point of view, the model’s structure must be taken to reveal structure in the 
 
10  A notable exception is Bailer-Jones (2009). 
 
11 I agree with Van Fraassen (2008) on the view that phenomena created by instruments are observable 
phenomena: “our instruments are engines of creation. They create new observable phenomena, ones that may 
never have happened in nature… Those new phenomena are themselves observable, and become part of our 
world,” (ibid, 87). 
 
12 See Chapter 7 in Bailer-Jones (2009) on phenomena, data and data-models. 
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observable phenomena, while the rest of the model must be serving that purpose indirectly” (ibid, 
87, my emphasis). In my view, Van Fraassen’s (anti-realist) empiricist position correctly avoids the 
suggestion that models can provide literal, picture-like representations of unobservable phenomena. 
Yet, his view also seems quite empty as to the content of the model. In short, in this view on 
phenomena, the expression “models represent their target-phenomenon” only means that model-
outcomes represent observable phenomena, while the content of the model does not represent 
anything real. Altogether, this view is insufficient regarding the role of non-observable real-world 
phenomena in scientific practices. 
 
Van Fraassen on observable phenomena 
Van Fraassen’s reason to distinguish between observable and non-observable phenomena is an 
empiricism that “involves a common sense realism in which reference to observable phenomena is 
unproblematic” (2008, 3). Although I am sympathetic to Van Fraassen’s empirical stance, his 
assumption that “the aim of science is to provide empirically adequate theories about what the 
world is like [i.e., about observable phenomena]”(ibid, 87), is too limited as an account of scientific 
practices. I agree that observable phenomena play a crucial role in testing empirical adequacy as a 
way to justify a theory or scientific model. Yet, the aim of science is not only empirically adequate 
theories, but also the construction of scientific models that allow different kinds of inferential 
reasoning.13 
In summary, unlike Van Fraassen’s point of view, I defend that philosophical accounts of models 
should not be limited to observable phenomena, but also explain the role of postulated non-
observable target-phenomena. In my view, non-observable phenomena are postulated to enable 
different kinds of inferential reasoning, which do not necessarily have to lead to true results, but 
which are productive to advance scientific research.14 
 
The problem of unobservable phenomena 
The other extreme is to assume that a scientific model literally represents an unobservable target-
phenomenon. I call this a picture-metaphor of models. A ‘literal representation’ in this context means 
something akin to how non-linguistic entities such as photographs, drawings, numerical tables, and 
graphs represent observable phenomena. As outlined above, authors like Giere suggest that these 
non-linguistic entities are ‘direct’ representations in the sense that humans are capable to recognize 
them as representations in a straightforward manner. Therefore, the expression “models represent 
their target-phenomenon” in this interpretation means that scientific models represent non-
observable phenomena in a more or less literal fashion. Suggestive examples are the model of DNA 
 
13 In this article, the notions ‘inferential reasoning’ (Suárez 2004) and ‘epistemic activities’ (Chang 2014) are 
used. Inferential reasoning according to Suárez assumes reasoning upon (non-linguistic) structures, whereas 
epistemic activities in the sense of Chang is a more open notion. I will use the two notions interchangeably, 
assuming that inferential reasoning is not limited to reasoning based on structures, but also based on, for 
example, conceptual content. 
 
14 My position agrees in many respects with Vaihinger’s (1911) philosophical view on ‘as if’ reasoning. This 
views, in turn, is close to current epistemological interpretations of Kant’s philosophy of science that I endorse. 
Vaihinger’s ideas have been taken up in the current movement of models as fictions (e.g., Fine 1993; Suárez 
2009). Although relevant to the issues at stake, I will not elaborate on the idea of models and representations 
as fictions in the present article. 
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referred to by Giere, but also the Bohr model of the atom, and models representing proteins and 
biochemical mechanisms. I stress that, in view of an epistemology of models, this interpretation is 
highly problematic because it is unclear how to arrive at more or less literal representations of these 
kinds of unobservable phenomena. 
 
Bogen and Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena 
Bogen & Woodward’s (1988) defense of the notion of phenomena can be taken as a realist, practice 
oriented response to Van Fraassen’s (1980) anti-realist notion of “saving the phenomena.” They 
defend that phenomena are: distinct from data; objective, stable features of the world; not always 
observable; not low-level theories; and, inferred from data (also see Bogen 2011; Woodward 2011). 
Loosely speaking, according to them, data are the observations reported by experimental scientists, 
while phenomena are objective, stable features of the world to which scientists infer based on 
reliable data. Data are ‘directly observed’ and idiosyncratic to particular experimental contexts, 
whereas phenomena have stable, repeatable characteristics that are detectable by means of a 
variety of different procedures, which may yield quite different kinds of data. Ontologically and 
epistemologically, they think of phenomena as being in the world, not just the way we talk about or 
conceptualize the natural order. On their realist account, therefore, phenomena are physical entities 
that exist independent of us. 
Although Bogen & Woodward’s account of phenomena is intuitively plausible from a scientific 
practice point of view, the philosophical difficulty is that their empiricism requires reconciling two 
assumptions, namely, on the one hand, that phenomena are inferred from data, and, on the other 
hand, that phenomena are not some kind of low-level theories. However, inferring phenomena from 
data, for instance by means of statistical methods, implies that the phenomenon is identical with the 
data-model derived from the data (Glymour, 2002), which does not add much to data-models in the 
semantic view. The other option is that the phenomenon (or should we rather say, the description of 
the phenomenon) represents a theoretical or conceptual interpretation of the data, which means 
that conceptual content has been added so that the data (or data-model) is converted into a low-
level theory, which they explicitly aim to avoid. Below, I propose that Massimi’s Kantian take on this 
issue provides a viable alternative. 
 
Phenomena as entities that ask for scientific explanations 
According to Hacking (1983), “[Phenomenon] has a fairly definite sense in the writing of scientists. A 
phenomenon is noteworthy. A phenomenon is discernible. A phenomenon is commonly an event or 
process of a certain type that occurs regularly under definite circumstances” (ibid,  221). Hacking 
refers to observable phenomena as not only occurrences observed in nature but also new 
phenomena that are generated in experimental set-ups, often through the operation of new 
technological instruments and noticed by attentive researchers who intervene with this equipment. I 
agree with Hacking (1983) that science postulates successful non-observable phenomena that are 
held causally responsible for specific observable phenomena and which he calls ‘theoretical entities.’ 
However, I am hesitant about his ‘entity realism,’ which is why I stick to the expression ‘purported 
non-observable real-world phenomena.’15 
 
15 More specifically on the meaning of purported non-observable real-world phenomena: I do not endorse a 
form or referential realism (see Teller 2020 for a plausible argument against referential realism). Instead, my 
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Accordingly, another option to explain what we mean by ‘phenomena’ is that scientific models 
structure or explain rather than ‘literally’ represent the observed or unobservable phenomenon. 
Hence, the scientific model can represent the phenomenon in terms of a (logical, morphological, or 
mathematical) structure that tells more than the data or data-pattern observed in nature or in the 
laboratory. In addition, a scientific model can also represent an explanation of the observed 
phenomenon, which usually includes representations of the causal workings in terms of (purported) 
non-observable real-world phenomena (such as mechanisms). The expression “models represent 
their target-phenomenon” then means that scientific models represent (purported) ‘underlying’ 
structures, that are presupposed to explain the observable phenomena – rather than representations 
being mere ‘descriptions.’ Altogether, these different options show that it is not fully clear what we 
actually mean by the expression that “models represent their target-phenomenon.” 
 
Massimi: Phenomena are not ready-made 
One of the reasons to argue for the role of disciplinary perspectives in science is that phenomena, be 
it observable or non-observable, are never observed in a straightforward manner, but always involve 
what can be called a perspective (e.g., a mathematical or conceptual framework). To make this point, 
I turn to Massimi’s (2007, 2008, 2011) Kantian account of phenomena. Massimi (2008) engages in the 
controversy between scientific realists (including Hacking and Giere) and Van Fraassen’s anti-realist 
constructive empiricism by asking, “how do we know that the entities, their properties and relations 
as described by our best scientific theories truly correspond to the way things are in nature?” (ibid, 
1). Massimi argues that a prevailing conception of phenomena, according to which phenomena are 
what ‘appears’ to us and to our perceptual apparatus, is at the heart of this debate. Therefore, both 
scientific realist and constructive empiricist positions are entrapped in “the view that phenomena are 
empirical manifestations of what there is” (ibid, 3). This view entails the idea that phenomena are 
‘ready-made,’ that is, phenomena lay bare in front of us. Massimi believes this view is inadequate. 
Her purpose is to show that phenomena are not ready-made for a scientific theory to either save 
them, as Van Fraassen thinks, or give a literally true story of them, as believed by scientific realists.  
The alternative philosophical conception of phenomena she proposes goes back to Kant. Massimi 
argues that from a Kantian point of view phenomena are not ready-made, not mere empirical 
manifestations of what there is. Instead, phenomena conform to our ways of representing: “our 
representation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as they are in 
themselves but rather these objects as appearances conform to our way of representing” (ibid, 9, my 
emphases). Therefore, “[A] phenomenon, …, is a conceptually determined appearance. ... 
phenomena are appearances brought under the concepts of the faculty of understanding so as to 
make experience finally possible,” (ibid, 10, 11). Massimi makes this idea about phenomena more 
concrete as follows: “in nature we may observe objects moving in space and time, changing physical 
state (from solid to liquid to gaseous) or displaying some properties (e.g. being elastic). But these are 
only appearances [Erscheinungen]. Only when we introduce moving forces as the underlying causes 
that make the objects move in space, or change their physical state, or displaying some physical or 
 
position agrees in many respects with Van Fraassen’s (epistemological) anti-realism. This position emphasizes a 
common-sense realism, not in the sense of believing that the purported phenomenon has a referent in the real 
world, but rather in the sense that observations and experiences of researchers derive from their (physical and 
technological) interactions with a world that is physically independent of their thoughts and beliefs. 
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chemical properties, do we have a conceptually determined appearance or phenomenon as the 
proper object of scientific knowledge” (ibid, 14).  
According to Massimi, the crucial, distinctively new feature that Kant introduced in the conception of 
phenomena is “that a physical phenomenon —intended as a conceptually determined appearance— 
has built in it from the very outset the concept of a moving force as the cause of the observed 
appearance. It is the causal concept of a moving force that distinguishes phenomena from 
appearances, or better, that transforms appearances into phenomena, i.e., objects of possible 
experience into objects of experience” (ibid, 14). I agree with Massimi that a Kantian conception of 
phenomena does better justice to the complexity of phenomena in scientific practice – in particular, 
by stressing that (representations of) phenomena entail conceptual content introduced by on how 
humans (cognitive agents) conceptualize perceptions and experiences. But new issues emerge that I 
will address shortly.  
 
What does ‘representation of a phenomenon’ mean? 
Based on this brief overview of ideas about phenomena, another problem emerges, because it has 
become unclear whether the word ‘phenomenon’ refers to a real-world thing, say a physical 
phenomenon ‘out there,’ or instead, to something that might just as well be called a representation. 
The notions of observable and non-observable phenomena in philosophical literature on scientific 
models suggest that phenomena are real physical things that we can look at or point to. But 
Massimi’s Kantian account of phenomena assumes that phenomena are conceptually determined 
appearances. This seems to suggest an idealism, which I would rather avoid here. Therefore, I 
propose firstly, that we must introduce the concept of representations of phenomena to give 
phenomena a proper place between data and models or theories, and also, to make the 
phenomenon suitable for epistemic activities such as modelling them. Secondly, close to Massimi, my 
view is that the representation of a phenomenon involves data being transformed into epistemic 
entities through mathematical, theoretical and conceptual frameworks. 
The progress made in this way is that our representations of phenomena can no longer be 
understood as if phenomena are somehow ‘literally’ read off or depicted from reality, but must be 
understood as representations that are the result of an interplay between our experiences, 
observations and data (the ‘appearances’), on the one hand, and mathematical, theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks on the other. In Section 6 it will be worked out somewhat further that the 
role of these frameworks must be interpreted as perspectives. 
As a consequence, notions such as ‘descriptions of (unobservable) phenomena’ and ‘models as 
representations of (unobservable) phenomena’ cannot be intuitively grasped by picture-like views of 
phenomena. The account of phenomena presented here shows that mathematical, theoretical and 
conceptual content is built in representations of phenomena. Subsequently, it is precisely this 
content that enables forms of inferential reasoning by scientific researchers that go beyond mere 
deductive or inductive forms of reasoning. In this way, we obtain a more adequate account of the 
role of phenomena in scientific practices.16  
 
16 The concept of representations of phenomena presented here is close to accounts of scientific concepts by 
Nersessian (2009c), Feest (2010), and Boon (2012). The crux is that the mathematical, theoretical and 
conceptual content that is built in the conception of phenomena (although based on ‘raw’ data) is partly 
hypothetical and fictional (e.g., Vaihinger 1911), rather than fully empirically grounded (as in the semantic 
view). Nonetheless, the resulting representation must meet pragmatic and epistemic criteria such as internal 
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The conceptual distinction between phenomena and models has become blurred due to the 
distinction that must be made between the target-phenomenon ‘that exist out there’ and that 
appear to us on the one hand, and ‘descriptions or representations of phenomena’ that count as 
epistemic entities, on the other. In the account proposed here, the latter should be understood as a 
‘conceptually determined appearance’ rather than a ‘literal image of the appearance.’ Consequently, 
the ‘description or representation of a target-phenomenon’ is already a scientific model1 of the 
phenomenon. Next, this ‘description or representation of the target-phenomenon’ (i.e., scientific 
model1) may ask for an explanation. This will produce yet another scientific model2 of the same 
target-phenomenon ‘out there.’ A more precise phrasing of the latter would say that ‘the scientific 
model2 represents an explanation of the target-phenomenon.’17, 18 
 
5. The construction of models as part of an epistemology of scientific 
models. 
Philosophical issues in an epistemology of scientific models 
The discussion so far makes plausible that an epistemology of scientific models must address a 
number of philosophical issues that arise when we let go of the picture-metaphor of models to 
explain how scientific models represent non-observable target-phenomena. These concern 
respectively: (a) Alternatives to the picture-metaphor of scientific models; (b) The assumption that 
scientific models are mere non-linguistic entities; (c) The question what a real-world target-
phenomenon is; (d) The issue of representing non-observable real-world phenomena; (e) The 
justification of models; (f) The question how models allow for inferential reasoning about the real-
world target-phenomenon. These issues seem non-existent as long as the picture-metaphor of 
models is maintained. However, this metaphor, in which the model is a more or less literal picture of 
the real-world target-phenomenon, appears problematic as the intuitive basis for our understanding 
of scientific models. This implies that an epistemology of models must provide an alternative to ‘how 
models represent’ in a way that satisfactorily resolves these issues. Here, I propose an alternative 
that does not take the ready-made model and target-phenomenon as the point of departure, but 
starts from the question of how scientific models are constructed – as this should clarify the 
questions raised in the transcendental and pragmatic approach aimed at an epistemology of models 
that suits scientific practice, such as: What are scientific models? What do scientific models represent 
exactly? How are scientific models connected to the real world? How is it possible that scientific 
models enable epistemic tasks related to real-world target-phenomena? 
 
coherence and logical consistence, intelligibility in the sense of physical conceivability (Massimi forthcoming a), 
physical plausibility, and empirical adequacy (Van Fraassen 1980). Additionally, it is precisely thanks to the 
conceptually meaningful but still hypothetical and fictional content built into the representation of the 
phenomenon that different kinds of inferential reasoning are made possible. Outcomes of inferential reasoning 
based on the representation of the purported real-world non-observable phenomenon can be tested against 
reality. In this manner, it is tested whether the hypothetical content and what this content allows to infer from 
it meets epistemic criteria such as empirical adequacy. 
 
17 Clearly, the first and the second model are not identical. Further analysis could aim to better understand 
their semantic and epistemological relationships. This issue will not be elaborated here. 
 
18 Also see Bokulich (2009), who sees the explanatory power of models as being closely related to their fictional 
nature. 
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Below, the implications of taking the model construction into account in an epistemology of scientific 
models will be discussed along the lines of the issues (a-f). To this end, I will use a systematic account 
of the (re)construction of models as proposed by Boon & Knuuttila (2009; Knuuttila & Boon 2011), 
which has been elaborated into a concrete, practically useful method, called the B&K method for the 
(re)construction of scientific models in scientific practices (Boon 2020).19  
 
Issue a: Alternatives to the picture-metaphor of scientific models – Models as hubs  
By starting with the question of how models are constructed, it becomes clear that models are rather 
a kind of hubs where heterogeneous aspects are brought together and merged into a coherent whole 
(cf. Nersessian and Patton 2009; Nersessian 2009a,b), which is then called the scientific model of a 
target-phenomenon. This alternative take on models shows that such an intricate construction 
process in which different types of content are chosen and merged, most probably does not result 
into a more or less literal picture of the target-phenomenon. An account of models as constructed 
epistemic entities (rather than being logically or algorithmically deduced from abstract theories, as in 
the semantic view), therefore, overcomes the idea that scientific models, metaphorically speaking, 
are more or less literal (in the sense of structurally similar) pictures of their target. 
 
Issue b: Are models mere non-linguistic entities?  
A widespread, although somewhat implicit, assumption is that models are non-linguistic entities, 
which may be a relic of the semantic view. In Section 2 it was explained that the advantage of this 
assumption is that semantic notions such as isomorphism or similarity can account for the 
representational relationship between observable structures or patterns. However, as was argued in 
Section 3, the idea of scientific models as mere non-linguistic entities is too limited. When we 
consider how actual scientific models of real-world phenomena are constructed, it is clear that 
models cannot be derived from abstract theories alone, nor can they be generated by a direct picture 
of reality. Instead, modeling is a construction process in which heterogeneous content is collected 
and combined into a coherent whole. When we look at the aspects that are built into the model (as 
in note 19) and think of models that are presented in the scientific literature, it becomes obvious that 
 
19 The proposed B&K method consists of ten questions to systematically determine the concrete aspects that 
are built into the scientific model (Boon 2020). This list can be employed to construct a model but also to 
reconstruct how an existing model was put together. In short these questions are: What is/are the: 
1. Problem context (which may refer to the socio-technological problem)? 
2. Target-system or physical-technological phenomenon (P) for which the model is constructed? 
3. Intended epistemic function(s) of the model? (which refers to inferential reasoning in regard to the 
problem stated in aspect 1). 
4. Model type? (for example, a causal mechanist, or a mathematical model; this choice is related to the 
intended epistemic function). 
5. Relevant (physical and/or technical) circumstances and properties (e.g., by which variables is a non-
observable phenomenon connected to the tangible world, or, by which variables is the phenomenon 
or target-system affected)? 
6. Measurable (physical-technological ) variables (i.e., how is the phenomenon identified or connected to 
the tangible world)? 
7. Idealizations, simplifications and abstractions (e.g., concerning aspects 2, 5 and 8)? 
8. Knowledge used in the construction of the model (e.g., theoretical principles and knowledge, 
knowledge of sub-phenomena, phenomenological laws, empirical knowledge)? 
9. Hypotheses (e.g., new concepts and explanations) built into the model? 
10. Justification or testing of the model? (Also see Section 5, issue e). 
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models are rather a kind of story about the phenomenon. In scientific articles, this story is usually 
clarified with pictures, diagrams and graphs. But the idea that these non-linguistic elements are ‘the 
model’ is mistaken. We should rather adopt the idea that the model consists of the entire content of 
a scientific article. 
 
Issue c: What is a real-world target-phenomenon? 
The question of characterizing the target-phenomenon represented in the model is usually not 
addressed in the literature of models.20 Knuuttila & Boon (2011), on the other hand, claim that 
developing a conception of the real-world target-phenomenon is an inherent part of the modelling 
process (note 19, aspect 2). Therefore, the ‘description’ of the target-phenomenon and the scientific 
model of the target-phenomenon are co-constructed epistemic entities.21 An example is how Sadi 
Carnot constructed the model of the ideal heat engine.22 By abstracting from much of what seems to 
characterize real-world heat-engines, Carnot conceives of heat-engines in terms of a phenomenon 
described as ‘heat is converted into motive-power.’ This is the imagined phenomenon for which he 
then constructs the model. In this way, imagining (i.e., constructing a ‘description’ of) the target-
phenomenon is part of the modelling process.23 
 
20 A notable exception is Contessa (2010), who discusses the ontological status of models, thus distinguishing 
between three types of models (material, mathematical, and fictional). Contessa argues that the ideal 
pendulum described in physics textbooks is not a material, nor a mathematical but rather a fictional object. 
Accordingly, Contessa argues that fictional models represent fictional entities. My notion of imaginary or 
imagined phenomena appears close to Contessa’s notion of fictional objects. However, although Contessa 
raises the question of how the model refers to the real world, he does not provide a satisfactory account of the 
semantic and epistemic relationships between fictional entities (which in his view are imaginary objects, such 
as the ideal pendulum) and real-world objects. Also see Toon (2012). 
 
21 The claim that the construction of a model first requires a representation of the target-phenomenon seems 
confusing with regard of the general idea that models are representations of their target-phenomenon. Two 
responses are possible. Firstly, the representation of the target-phenomenon can indeed already serve as a 
preliminary model (which is an idea proposed in Knuuttila & Boon 2011). Secondly, as already indicated in 
Section 4, scientific models are often more than a strict (e.g., ‘literal,’ ‘picture-like,’ or ‘descriptive’) 
representation of the phenomenon, because models usually offer explanatory or theoretical (e.g., 
mathematical) interpretations of the target-phenomenon. In this case, the phrase “the model represents the 
target-phenomenon” actually means that the model represents an explanation of the phenomenon. Pushing 
this further, it can also be said that “the model represents the phenomenon2 (e.g., a causal mechanism) that 
explains the target-phenomenon1.” 
 
22 Carnot’s construction of the model of the ideal heat engine is a case that cannot be grasped by the original 
semantic view of theories, because the model is not derived from an abstract theory. Instead, thermodynamic 
theory emerged from Carnot’s model of the ideal heat engine. Unfortunately, many textbooks in 
thermodynamics present the ideal heat engine as if it derives from thermodynamic theory, that is, as if 
thermodynamic theory made the invention of heat engines possible. 
 
23 Frigg & Nguyen (2016a), in their DEKI account of representation, use Kendrew’s plasticine model of 
myoglobin as an example. In this example, myoglobin is the target-system T. Hence, in my vocabulary, 
myoglobin, is the purported non-observable real-world target-phenomenon that is represented in the model. 
According to Frigg & Nguygen, the model M denotes its target system T, and denotation is the core of 
representation. However, although their DEKI account of representation claims that denotation of the target-
system is crucial to modelling, they do not explain how the target system T is denoted, i.e., how it is possible 
that scientific researchers denote, identify, indicate, or whatever you call it, a target-phenomenon. This 
problem is at the core of my article. 
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In line with Massimi’s (2008) Kantian account of phenomena discussed above (Section 4), this 
example shows that the description of the target-phenomenon is not ‘ready-made.’ It is not an 
empirical manifestation of what there is, but instead, an interpretation of an observed or 
experienced object, property or process such as the real heat engine as experienced and interpreted 
by Carnot. Such an interpretation requires to bring observations, experiences, or data under 
(scientific) concepts (i.e., ‘subsumption under concepts’).24 This can be concepts that already exist, or 
newly invented scientific concepts (Feest 2010; Boon 2012). Crucially, in this way conceptual content 
enters into the model. 
Additionally, the way in which target-phenomena are conceived in scientific practice involves the 
kind of practical and/or scientific problem that the researcher aims to tackle (note 19, aspect 1). In 
the example of Carnot this implies that his conception25 of the phenomenon (the imagined 
phenomenon) not only encompasses abstract or theoretical concepts such as ‘heat,’ ‘motive power,’ 
and ‘conversion,’ but also practical or functional concepts concerning the practical problem he aims 
to solve by his theoretical approach.26  
In scientific practice, therefore, determining and characterizing the real-world target-phenomenon 
already involves theoretical and conceptual interpretations of data and experiences as an inherent 
part of the model construction. As a consequence, the ‘description’ of the real-world target-
phenomenon is the imaginary phenomenon. Furthermore, the target-phenomenon is detected (in 
the real world) by the same measurable variables that characterize the imaginary phenomenon (in 
the model), securing a representational relationship between a structure generated by the model 
and a structure generated by the real-world target-system (as in the semantic view). 
 
Issue d: How do models represent non-observable real-world target-phenomena?  
Characterizing the semantic and epistemic relationship between the model and the target-
phenomenon in terms of similarity, likeness, etc., makes sense in a picture-metaphor of 
representation. However, when the representational relationship concerns purported non-
observable phenomena it is difficult to understand what ‘similarity’ means, because a direct visual 
comparison no longer seems to have a clear meaning. Alternatively, the possibility to connect (i.e., to 
draw a cogent semantic relationship) between the model and the real-world is warranted by how the 
 
24 Vaihinger (1911), in a Kantian fashion, stressed the importance of subsumption under concepts, which is a 
crucial part of his notion of ‘as if’ reasoning in scientific practice. By bringing observations or experiences under 
a concept an imaginary phenomenon is generated (e.g., a regularity, a law, an invisible entity, or a property). 
Subsequently, the structure or content of the concept enables epistemic agents to reason about that imaginary 
phenomenon – i.e., it enables inferential reasoning through the structure and content introduced by the 
concept. It is important to see that in this manner, Vaihinger defends an anti-realist position in the sense that 
subsumption under concepts enables ‘as if’ rather than ‘it is’ reasoning. 
 
25 My use of the words ‘conception’ or ‘conceptualize’ is similar to Rouse’s (2011) notion of ‘conceptual 
articulation.’ I use the two notions interchangeably. 
  
26 The practical problem is improving the ‘useful effect’ (which at some point got translated into ‘energy-
efficiency’) of real heat engines. Carnot translates this into a theoretical problem as follows: “The question 
whether the motive power of heat [i.e. the useful effect that a heat engine is capable of producing] is limited or 
whether it is boundless has been frequently discussed. Can we set a limit to the improvement of the heat-
engine, a limit which, by the very nature of the things, cannot in any way be surpassed? Or conversely, is it 
possible for the process of improvement to go on indefinitely?” [Sadi Carnot (1824), Reflexions on the Motive 
Power of Fire and on Engines fitted to develop that Power]. 
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model is constructed. In particular, when researchers choose the variables that characterize or 
causally affect the (observable, or the purported non-observable) target-phenomenon, they are 
guided by which variables are detectable or measurable (see note 19, aspect 6). In other words, 
these variables are not randomly chosen, nor do they emerge from nowhere. Note that this 
emphasis on the role of measurable data in constructing scientific models of real-world phenomena 
complies with how connections between theory and world are established according to the semantic 
view (Section 2). Thus, by including the relevant measurable (physical-technological) variables in the 
construction of a scientific model, a connection is warranted between the variables that characterize 
the imaginary phenomenon in the model and those that characterize the real-world target-
phenomenon (also see issue c). 
 
Issue e: The justification of models  
The question of how models are justified is not generally dealt with in the literature on models. This 
may be due to the idea that similarity between model and target-phenomenon suffices as 
justification: either objectively determined by the comparison between the structure of the model 
and that of the target, as in the semantic view, or subjectively determined by researchers, as in the 
accounts by Giere and Suárez. Instead, Knuuttila & Boon (2011) emphasize that models are partly 
justified by how the model is built. This involves a creative process of critically searching, selecting, 
conceptualizing, assessing and combining supposedly adequate and relevant heterogeneous aspects 
that are forged into a coherent whole (note 19). One of these aspects is the choice of relevant and 
measurable variables to characterize both the imagined phenomenon represented in the model and 
the purported real-world phenomena. Another one is the choice of scientific concepts to characterize 
the phenomenon.  
Scientific models are justified and tested in at least three ways that complement each other, namely: 
(i) by justifying the relevance, physical plausibility, and adequacy of aspects that are built into the 
model; (ii) by assessing whether the model meets relevant epistemic and pragmatic criteria such as 
internal coherence, internal consistence, intelligibility and physical plausibility,27 and adequacy with 
regard to the current state of knowledge; and (iii) through empirical or experimental testing against 
reality by comparing model-outcomes and experimental results in order to achieve empirical 
adequacy.28  
In the second part of this article (Section 6), I will argue that the choices of the heterogeneous 
aspects are also guided and justified the disciplinary perspective within which the researcher works. 
 
 
27 These epistemic criteria (intelligibility and physical plausibility) seem to resonate with Massimi’s (forthcoming 
a) notion of physical conceivability. 
 
28 Note that the semantic notions isomorphism and similarity to describe the semantic relationship between 
model and world only applies to this third way of testing a scientific model, that is, to the semantic relationship 
between the model-outcome and the experimental-outcomes. This accords with ideas about testing against 
reality in the semantic view. However, this is only one part of the testing of a model. It is important to 
recognize that the other two ways of testing are not through somehow assessing isomorphism or similarity 
between model and world.  
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Issue f: How do scientific models allow for inferential reasoning?  
An important aspect of an epistemology of scientific models is to explain how models can be sources 
of (new) knowledge. To be useful for researchers in performing epistemic tasks, scientific models 
must enable inferential reasoning, either internal to the model in regard of the imaginary object 
represented in the model (as is emphasized in fictional accounts of models, e.g., Barberousse & 
Ludwig 2008; Suárez 2009; Contessa 2010, Toon 2012), or externally oriented to generate model-
outcomes that describe or represent aspects of the real-world target-phenomenon. 
Suárez (2003, 2004) proposes an inferential conception of representation, which entails the idea that 
“[the internal structure of the representation] A allows competent and informed agents to [correctly] 
draw specific inferences regarding [the target] B” (Suárez 2004, 773). This does not require “that A 
[merely] allows deductive reasoning and inference; any type of reasoning —inductive, analogical, 
abductive— is in principle allowed, and A may be anything as long as it is the vehicle of the reasoning 
that leads an agent to draw inferences regarding B” (ibid, 773). Furthermore, Suárez stresses that 
‘correctly drawing inferences’ is not equivalent to ‘drawing inferences to true conclusions.’ I adopt 
Suárez’s idea that scientific models allow inferential reasoning by researchers, and also, that 
inferential reasoning can be any type of cogent reasoning. However, unlike Suárez’s deflationary 
notion of representation, I argue that an epistemology of scientific models must also explain how it is 
possible that models enable inferential reasoning,13 not only internally, but also related to (purported 
non-observable) real-world target-phenomena.29, 30 First of all, as scientific models are not, or not 
exclusively derived from abstract theories, it must be explained how models are constructed and 
justified that make these kinds of epistemic activities possible at all, for which the B&K method is 
proposed (note 19). Next, based on the analysis so far, I assume that: (i) the full content of the model 
–consisting of the ‘coherent story’ constructed by integrating the aspects put forward in the B&K 
method (note 19)— allows for such reasoning; (ii) therefore, not only the (non-linguistic) internal 
structure of scientific models allows for different types of inferential reasoning about the target-
phenomenon, but also the conceptual content and other aspects built into the model, such as 
knowledge regarding the physico-technological interactions with the (supposed) real-world target-
phenomenon and theoretical knowledge; and (iii) as has been argued in Section 2, ‘direct’ 
comparison between model (model-outcomes) and an unobservable target-phenomenon is (only) 
 
29 Philosophers may disagree whether this question is worth philosophical analysis. Giere, for example, 
rhetorically asks: “Do we, as theorists of science, need to give a more detailed account of the processes of 
interpretation..? I think not. We can pass this job off to linguists and cognitive scientists. We know it can be 
done because it is done” (Giere 2010, 271). Similarly, Suárez (2011), in his review of Bailer-Jones’ monograph, 
denies that her “burning question” deserved explanation. Her burning question is: “How is it that there is 
something about the model that allows us to demonstrate something that then, after appropriate 
interpretation, becomes applicable to and insightful about real-world phenomena?” (Bailer-Jones 2009, 197). 
Both Giere (2010) and Suárez (2004) thus shift the question of how it is possible that models allow for 
inferential reasoning to the competent and informed agent. Clearly, I disagree with them on this issue. With 
regard to scientific practices this is the fascinating and difficult to solve aspect of scientific representation. In 
particular, when models supposedly represent target-phenomena that cannot be observed in a direct and 
straightforward way (such as DNA), it is difficult to understand, even for competent researchers, how the 
scientific model is similar to its target-phenomenon or why its structure allows correct inferential reasoning 
about it. Their accounts, therefore, are not very informative about the epistemic functioning of models and 
modelling in scientific practice. 
 
30 Also see Toon (2012), who argues that the more sophisticated version of Giere’s (2010) similarity view that 
appeals to the role played by scientists and their representational capacities is not yet sufficient. Instead, we 
must describe how it is that scientists use models to represent, and proponents of the similarity view “must 
offer a different account of how similarities are put to work in scientific representation” (ibid, 255). 
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possible by means of the measurable or detectable features by which the phenomenon is 
characterized (also see issue e). In the second part of this article (Section 6), I will argue that the 
disciplinary perspective is the broader framework through which the construction, justification and 
reasoning with models is possible. 
 
Taking stock: Towards an epistemology of scientific models 
In the first part of this article, I have argued that it is difficult to clarify what exactly we mean when 
we talk about scientific models that supposedly represent non-observable phenomena. Getting a 
philosophical grip on this is relevant for better understanding scientific practices. The intuitively 
plausible idea about scientific representation, expressed in sentences such as “[S]cience provides us 
with representations of atoms, …, and the world’s climate” (Frigg & Nguyen, 2016a), and, “scientific 
models represent their target-phenomenon,” is problematic. On the basis of my analysis so far an 
epistemology of scientific models that suits scientific practices can be summarized by the following 
statements: 
(1) An epistemology of scientific models should not be guided by a picture-metaphor but take into 
account how scientific models are constructed. 
(2) Scientific models are constructed by combining heterogeneous aspects (as in note 19), which 
researchers must integrate into a coherent whole that allows different kinds of inferential 
reasoning. Additionally, in the process of developing them, models are a kind of hub where these 
heterogeneous aspects are brought together. 
(3) In order to be meaningful and intelligible for scientific researchers, scientific models must also 
contain linguistic (i.e., conceptually meaningful epistemic) content. This implies that scientific 
models tell a kind of story rather than being self-explanatory pictures. For that reason, it is better 
to assume that the full content of a scientific article about a specific target-phenomenon is the 
scientific model. Indeed, the story told in scientific articles is clarified by means of mathematical 
formula, graphs, diagrams and pictures, but the idea that these non-linguistic elements are the 
model is mistaken. 
(4) Constructing a model of a target-phenomenon requires a representation (or ‘description’) of the 
real-world target-phenomenon to begin with. This representation is not ‘ready-made’ but is also 
the result of creative and constructive activities by researchers. As a consequence, the 
conceptual articulation of a target-phenomenon is usually part of the modelling process.31 
(5) Scientific models are tested and justified in at least three different ways that complement each 
other. 
(6) Scientific models enable inferential reasoning (and more broadly, epistemic activities) through 
the entire content built into the model, which encompasses the (non-linguistic) internal 
structure, the conceptual content (e.g., scientific concepts), the physico-technological context, 
theoretical knowledge, etc. (see note 19). 
(7) Scientific models are constructed within a specific scientific discipline. Within this discipline, 
epistemic activities such as conceptualizing target-phenomena and constructing scientific models 
 
31 The idea that the conceptual articulation (and representation) of the target-phenomenon is an inherent part 
of the model, to some extent corresponds to ideas that are put forward in a fiction-view of models. However, 
my worry is that fiction views of models do not explain the semantic and epistemic relationship between the 
imaginary phenomenon represented in the model and the real-world target-phenomenon. 
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are guided and constrained by a disciplinary perspective. This is the topic of the second part of 
this article (Section 6). 
 
6. Disciplinary perspectives in the construction of scientific models 
Disciplinary perspectives in science 
My philosophical argument for defending the indispensable role of disciplinary perspectives in 
science can be summarized as follows. First, the finding that a direct ‘picture-like’ representational 
relationship between scientific models and target-phenomena is problematic for philosophical 
reasons, leads to the idea that this representational relationship must be clarified by investigating 
how scientific models are constructed. Subsequently, I argued that scientific models in scientific 
practices are not mere non-linguistic entities (e.g., observed patterns, or mathematical structures 
derived from abstract theory), but are better understood as hubs in which heterogeneous aspects 
are combined into a coherent whole that consists of both linguistic and non-linguistic content. Also, 
the construction of models (as well as the conceptual articulation of the phenomena) requires 
creative and constructive epistemic activities by researchers, who search, assess, choose and 
integrate the heterogeneous aspects that they built into the model.32 This involves epistemic 
activities such as, to select, organize, structure and interpret empirical data or phenomena by 
choosing (or inventing) relevant epistemic components. Examples are: fundamental principles; 
mathematical structures; physically meaningful concepts (e.g., elasticity, oscillation, force); practical 
and theoretical knowledge (e.g., abstract theory; phenomenological and scientific laws); and, 
explanatory hypotheses. In turn, epistemic activities are guided by epistemic and pragmatic criteria 
such as, coherence, consistency, adequacy, intelligibility, physical plausibility and relevance. Finally, I 
suggest that the epistemic activities, as well as the choices and judgments that are needed in the 
construction of scientific models are guided and enabled by the disciplinary perspectives of the 
practice within which the researcher works. 
 
The roles of scientific and instrumental perspectives in scientific practices  
Metaphorically, perspectives are like a pair of glasses. They enable to see aspects of the world in a 
specific way. The strong version, which I endorse, holds that without perspectives nothing 
meaningful is seen or known. Perspectives in this strong version are more like a pair of eyes. 
Perspectives are therefore not representations, but the means by which representations are 
generated. Giere (2006) and Van Fraassen (2008) have argued that different types of perspectives 
feature in science, enabling different kinds of both instrumental (technological) or epistemic 
activities to generate representations. Based on their insights I distinguish different kinds of 
perspectives in scientific practices: 
Firstly, it is only through scientific perspectives in the sense of mathematical and/or conceptual 
frameworks (including laws, scientific concepts and phenomenological analogies) and fundamental 
(ontological) beliefs that researchers ‘recognize’ a real-world target-phenomenon in ‘raw’ 
observations, experiences and data. It is only possible, therefore, to form a mathematically or 
 
32 My notion of scientific practice and epistemic activities agrees in many respect with Chang’s ‘system of 
practice’ (2014, 2020). 
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conceptually meaningful representation of a phenomenon out of ‘raw’ data by means of these kinds 
of perspectives. Without them, no phenomenon is seen or recognized (also see Rueger 2005).  
Secondly, researchers generate ‘raw’ data using (technological) instruments and experimental 
procedures, which therefore count as instrumental perspectives (Giere 2006; Van Fraassen 2008). 
Based on the analysis of the semantic view in Section 2, I add that the data is therefore of a specific 
type, namely, as determined by the instrumental perspective. Thus, the instrumental perspective 
determines the specific way in which the purported phenomenon is characterized and represented. 
For example, the behavior of a bullet is conceptualized as a trajectory, and represented by the 
measured variable, i.e., the x-y-z location as a function of time, and not the mass, shape or 
roughness.33 
Thirdly, researchers use practical and theoretical knowledge about the instruments and procedures 
indicative of a purported non-observable real-world phenomenon to predict the occurrence of this 
phenomenon elsewhere (cf., Boon 2017). The crux is that although researchers do not have direct 
access, they suspect that a non-observable phenomenon must be present in the case of physical-
technological conditions at which the (non-observable) phenomenon is believed to exist. This type of 
knowledge about instruments and procedures therefore offers a scientific and instrumental 
perspective on physical or technological systems, with which researchers can produce knowledge 
about already known but unobservable aspects of that system.  
Fourth, similar to the conceptual articulation of phenomena, the construction of scientific models 
requires that researchers use theoretical, mathematical and conceptual frameworks to structure, 
interpret or explain the real-world target-phenomenon (note 19, aspects 8 and 9). In this way, 
structure and conceptually meaningful content is built into the model, which is crucial for becoming a 
representation at all. Giere (2006) argues that the used frameworks are scientific perspectives. 
Fifth, epistemic entities such as ‘representations of phenomena’ and ‘scientific models’ can 
themselves acquire the role of scientific perspectives for performing epistemic tasks. Scientific 
models, for example, allow different kinds of inferential reasoning, such as deductive, inductive, 
predictive, explanatory, explorative, hypothetical and ‘what if …’ reasoning about the target-
phenomena. In this capacity, the model functions as a perspective with which new hypotheses, 
knowledge or questions regarding the target-phenomenon are generated.34 In addition, scientific 
models as perspectives also make inferential reasoning possible about interventions with physical or 
technological systems. For example about how you could manipulate, control, generate or create the 
(purported) real-world target-phenomenon. 
This list shows different types of perspectives and their roles in scientific practices. Below, I will 
propose a more systematic (Kuhnian) framework to characterize disciplinary perspectives. 
 
 
33 According to Giere (2006), this phenomenon is then interpreted as a Newtonian system. Hence, Newton’s 
theory is used as a theoretical perspective to generate a scientific model of the phenomenon, i.e., a 
representation that interprets or structures the phenomenon in a very specific way. Vaihinger (1911) would 
rather say that the phenomenon is subsumed under Newton’s laws of motion. The resulting scientific model 
then allows ‘as if’ reasoning about the phenomenon. 
 
34 Boon & Knuuttila (2009), and Knuuttila & Boon (2011) call models epistemic tools. In fact, they thereby point 
at this capacity of scientific models to be used (in the current vocabulary) as perspectives in epistemic tasks. 
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The role of disciplinary perspectives in constructing a phenomenon 
The construction of (‘descriptions’ or representations of) target-phenomena takes place in a broader 
disciplinary context. I propose to call the intellectual, epistemic and conceptual part of the discipline 
the disciplinary perspective of a scientific practice. Briefly said, the disciplinary perspective enables 
researchers in a specific scientific discipline to reason and conceptualize, but it also constrains them. 
Therefore, ‘conceiving of’ (or, ‘conceptually articulating’) the target-phenomenon does not take 
place in void, but already involves many different aspects that are known to, and understood by the 
researcher. More specifically, the imagined phenomenon is embedded in a network consisting of 
different types of intellectual, epistemic and conceptual aspects. Examples are: partially interpreted 
(i.e., conceptualized) real-world experiences (e.g., the workings of heat, motive-power and heat-
engines); scientific concepts and conceptual frameworks (e.g., ‘caloric,’ ‘heat,’ ‘motive-power,’ etc.); 
established practical knowledge (e.g., about the workings of experimental set-ups); empirical and 
phenomenological knowledge (e.g., about experimental findings by other scientists); fundamental 
principles (e.g., heat cannot flow from cold to hot); theoretical knowledge (e.g., the gas-laws of Boyle 
and others); measurable variables (e.g., mass, volume, pressure, and temperature); and, established 
conceptually meaningful parameters (e.g., ‘density,’ ‘specific heat’).35 A closer look at these aspects 
makes it clear that this network connects the imagined phenomenon with both the real-world target-
phenomenon (e.g., in terms of measurable variables) and with mathematical and conceptually 
meaningful content (e.g., through theories and concepts).36 
The network of aspects through which a phenomenon is identified is an important part of the 
disciplinary perspective that guides and also constrains (communities of) researchers. It enables 
them to perform creative, critical and constructive epistemic activities in the construction of 
representations and in the use of models for inferential reasoning. Accordingly, the question of how 
the representational relationship between the imagined and the purported real-world target-
phenomenon is to be understood is explained by how they are embedded in the disciplinary 
perspective. On the one hand, the imagined phenomenon in the model is conceptualized within the 
disciplinary perspective. On the other hand, the real-world phenomenon is characterized or 
determined by experimental setups or (technological) measurement procedures typical of the 
discipline, and accordingly represented in a specific way through the disciplinary perspective. More 
specifically, the specific constellation that characterizes or determines the purported non-observable 
real-world phenomenon includes reference to relevant measurable variables and parameters, 
measuring instruments and experimental set-ups, along with theories, concepts and models that 
 
35 These examples of relevant aspects form the disciplinary perspective within which Carnot conceptualized the 
phenomenon (“heat is converted into motive-power”) and constructed the model of the ideal heat engine. 
They can be found in Carnot’s (1824) treatise. 
 
36 One of the reasons for endorsing perspectivism in the philosophical literature, is the concern that scientific 
practices use multiple conflicting models to explain and understand the same phenomenon (e.g., Rice 2020; 
Fagan 2020; Mitchell 2020). However, when accepting my suggestion that unobservable phenomena are 
defined and characterized within a complex constellation of different aspects, authors could look more 
critically at what "the same phenomenon" means. Wolff (2020) provides a comprehensive point of departure 
for such an investigation. ‘Alcohol addiction’ is my own simple example to show that ‘the same phenomenon’ 
may be a problematic notion, because this ‘observable’ phenomenon is turned into a much more sophisticated 
conception when studied in either sociology, psychology, neurobiology, or genetics. In each of these scientific 
disciplines, the conception of the phenomenon is linked to theoretical concepts and measurement procedures 
of that discipline, as well as to the specific research questions asked in the discipline, usually in view of the 
practical (societal) problem. Therefore, it is not at all ‘the same phenomenon’ that is modelled in different 
disciplines. 
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describe or explain these instruments and experiments, and, depending on where one starts the 
research, reference to the imagined phenomenon.37 
In sum, instead of a picture-like representational relationship between the imagined and the 
purported real-world target-phenomenon, both are conceptualized and identified through specific 
constellations within the discipline. This makes their representational relationship much more 
complex. At the same time, the conceptually rich representations of both imagined and real-world 
target-phenomena that are crafted with the help of a disciplinary perspective enable different kinds 
of inferential reasoning by researchers, leading to new creative ideas, relevant questions and 
challenging hypotheses. 
 
A Kuhnian framework for characterizing disciplinary perspectives 
As was suggested above, researchers in specialized fields or disciplines have developed and 
internalized perspectives that give direction to how they approach research, which is called a 
disciplinary perspective. Researchers have adopted the disciplinary perspective, often without being 
fully aware of it, since the perspective is not usually explicitly conveyed or reflected upon. A 
metaphor for this role of the disciplinary perspective in becoming a researcher is that they have 
learned to look through a specific kind of spectacles, which they now wear without noticing it. In a 
Kuhnian fashion, I suggest that disciplinary perspectives can be characterized as consisting of 
heterogeneous but mutually cohering elements that support and reinforce each other. These aspects 
are listed here:  
(i) Intrinsic aims and objectives related to what is considered the subject-matter of research in 
the discipline, usually reflected in the name of the discipline. For example, mechanics, 
chemistry, systems biology. 
(ii) Practical purposes that are related to ideas about the extrinsic, practical relevance of the 
research-projects in the discipline. This purpose is usually reflected in the name of applied 
scientific fields, such as in technology (e.g., membrane technology), medicine (e.g., oncology, 
immunology), and agriculture (e.g., plant pathology). These disciplines raise research 
questions oriented at practical applications such as: “Can we improve the energy efficiency 
of steam engines?” “Can we bio-mimic photosynthesis to harvests sunlight?” “Can we find a 
drug for this type of cancer?” “Can we find a cure for alcohol addiction?” “Can we cultivate a 
species that is resistant to this pest?”  
(iii) Research questions typical of the discipline, which are related to the intrinsic and extrinsic 
aims of the discipline. For example: “What is the mechanism that explains these 
phenomena?” “Which genetic factors are related to alcohol addiction?” “Which factors in an 
 
37 In several respects my view of phenomena corresponds with Rouse’s (2009, 2011) ideas about the roles of 
scientific concepts and hypothetical entities in scientific practice. According to Rouse, laboratory work and 
experiments play a crucial role in articulating and consolidating conceptual understanding. He stresses that 
experimentation is integral to conceptual articulation of the phenomenon. This also involves the idea that 
activity and practice precede ontology, an idea that I endorse in the present article. Accordingly, in my 
terminology, phenomena are postulated in the interaction between experimenting, measuring and 
conceptualizing. It is through the intellectual activities of researchers that a (non-observable) real-world 
phenomenon is conceptually postulated, while at the same time the purported phenomenon is physically 
determined, characterized and established by the researchers’ practical activities (e.g., experimenting and 
measuring). 
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individual’s personal history contributes to alcohol addiction?” Also see Carnot’s scientific 
question in note 26. 
(iv) The types of real-world phenomena (observable and non-observable) typically investigated in 
the discipline. Usually, the observable phenomena are related to the kinds of phenomena 
described in the external, practical purposes or problems that the discipline aims to engage 
with (e.g., technological functions, illnesses, pests). The non-observable phenomena are 
related to the more fundamental ontology of the discipline. They are the kinds of things in 
terms of which the discipline aims to understand and intervene with the observable 
phenomena. For example: Chemistry studies phenomena related to molecules. Microbiology 
studies phenomena related to micro-organisms. Biochemistry studies phenomena related to 
biochemical pathways. Psychology studies phenomena related to (the behaviour of) 
individuals. In this article, I have suggested that non-observable phenomena are 
characterized and defined by a specific constellation within the discipline. This, includes, for 
example: the data and observable phenomena indicative of the non-observable 
phenomenon; the measurement instruments and procedures that produce these data and 
observable phenomena; experimental set ups by which the purported phenomenon is 
investigated; and, the scientific concept or phenomenological law ‘describing’ it (also see 
Feest 2010; Boon 2012). 
(v) Fundamental (ontological) principles, basic assumptions and beliefs used in the construction 
of scientific models and the conceptual articulation of non-observable phenomena. For 
example, fundamental principles in chemistry are conservation principles such as the 
principles that mass, atoms, charge and energy cannot appear or disappear. 
(vi) Mathematical frameworks and axiomatic systems typical of the discipline. In my explanation 
of the semantic view, I suggested that mathematical equations entail variables and 
parameters that must be measurable in the discipline. For example, disciplines that make use 
of thermodynamics in their modelling of phenomena (e.g., when investigating aspects of 
‘artificial photosynthesis’), will also need to have measurement procedures to determine the 
variables and parameters in the mathematical equations that represent the thermodynamic 
properties of these phenomena (e.g., voltage, wave-length, thermal and electrical energy). 
Therefore, the (sets of) equations produced through these frameworks are interconnected 
with measurements and instruments specified in aspect viii below. 
(vii) (Theoretical) conceptual frameworks and empirical (phenomenological) knowledge accepted 
in the discipline, including specific scientific concepts indicating observable and non-
observable phenomena, and other technical terms. For example, chemistry uses scientific 
concepts that refer to perceivable properties such as ‘colour,’ ‘acidity,’ ‘viscosity,’ ‘fluidity,’ 
and ‘crystallinity,’ and also to purported non-observable phenomena such as ‘atoms,’ 
‘molecules’ and ‘chemical reactions.’ The conceptual framework also encompasses theories 
and models that represent aspects of these phenomena, such as causal mechanisms that are 
held responsible for specific properties or chemical conversions. 
(viii) Measurement instruments and procedures used in the discipline, including practical and 
theoretical knowledge about these techniques and procedures. For example, chemistry 
typically uses equipment such as a balance, a thermometer, a pH-meter, an Eh-meter, an 
oxygen-meter, a gas-flow meter, gas chromatography, and mass spectrometry. Researchers 
usually have practical and theoretical understanding of the workings of this equipment. 
(ix) Research methods and typical strategies to investigate the phenomena. For example, 
disciplines usually develop specific types of experimental set-ups to investigate phenomena 
of interest (i.e., aspect viii). These are usually reported in the materials and methods section 
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of a scientific article. Additionally, these methods and strategies are interconnected with and 
enabled by aspects v-vii above and aspects x-xi below. 
(x) Epistemic and pragmatic criteria that epistemic results such as scientific models should meet. 
More general criteria that were already mentioned, are shared by most experimental 
practices. But also more specific criteria may apply, which have to do, for instance with the 
specific application context, such as ‘reliability,’ ‘simplicity,’ ‘applicability,’ ‘specificity,’ and 
‘predictive power.’ 
(xi) Representational means typical of the discipline, such as mathematical models, computer 
simulations, causal-mechanistic models, specific types of diagrams, pictures, and physical 
models. 
The listed aspects i-xi together characterize the disciplinary perspective.38 Each of these aspects 
deserve further explanation. Also, their mutual relationships need to be worked out in more detail. 
Moreover, philosophers will undoubtedly wish to know how these aspects are justified, or whether 
they are necessary and sufficient. For the moment, my approach in listing is pragmatic, based on 
knowledge and understanding of existing research practices. Still some justification can be given. The 
reader may have noticed the overlap between this Kuhnian framework to analyse a disciplinary 
perspective, and the B&K method for constructing or reconstructing scientific models (note 19). This 
should indeed be the case because researchers need guidance in drawing up a scientific model by 
making decisions and choices about the aspects listed in the B&K method. The disciplinary 
perspective makes these decisions and choices possible. So, the disciplinary perspective guides and 
restricts the construction process. This means, therefore, that the elements indicated in the 
disciplinary perspective must cover the type of choices and decisions that are made when 
constructing scientific models. 
Different scientific disciplines have different disciplinary perspectives, but I argue that each of them 
can be analyzed in terms of this Kuhnian framework (i.e., the aspects i-xi). The concrete, discipline-
specific disciplinary perspective is what researchers in that discipline ‘have in mind.’ Researchers are 
trained in using the disciplinary perspective. This gives them direction in their research efforts, for 
example in how to set up a research project and how to perform practical and epistemic activities in 
the discipline. Most often, the disciplinary perspective ‘automatically’ gives direction to how 
researchers conduct their research. But the disciplinary perspective does not function as an 
algorithm. Scientific research still involves a process of searching, choosing, and ‘fitting together’ (cf., 
Hacking 1992). Researchers must solve puzzles and make creative leaps to generate scientific models 
that meet the requirements of the discipline. And although the number of options is limited within a 
discipline, researchers still have to make numerous choices and decisions about what and how they 
conduct the research. In the types of choices that must be made, the aspects i-xi of the disciplinary 
perspective are guiding and constraining, although researchers are usually not explicitly aware of 
this. 
 
Evaluating disciplinary perspectives. 
The claim in this article is that scientific models are constructed within the boundaries of a discipline 
and guided by that discipline's disciplinary perspective. This leads to an (epistemological) anti-
realism, such as defended by Van Fraassen (1980, 2008) and also Vaihinger (1911), which I endorse. 
The idea the disciplinary perspectives play an indispensable role suggests that each discipline can 
 
38 This list of elements (i-xi) is not meant to be exhaustive, nor will all these elements always be present or 
relevant when analysing and articulating a disciplinary perspective. 
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generate completely different and even incompatible models of reality. This consequence may give 
leeway to harmful forms of subjectivism and relativism. I contend that this can be avoided in 
different kinds of ways. Firstly, the construction process and the resulting scientific models must 
adhere to pragmatic and epistemic criteria that apply within the discipline (aspect x). Secondly, 
several of the epistemic criteria operative in a scientific discipline transcend the specific disciplinary 
perspective. For example, internal coherence, logical consistence and empirical adequacy. 
Additionally, some of the theoretical frameworks transcend specific disciplines. Thirdly, the present 
article focuses on scientific practices that aim at scientific models (amongst other things) for 
adequately dealing with real-world problems (i.e., aspect ii). The focus on societally relevant 
epistemic purposes may allow for dealing in a more pragmatic fashion with controversies. 
Nevertheless, because of this societal purpose of scientific research, it is crucial that scientific results 
are critically evaluated with regard to epistemic and pragmatic criteria (i.e., aspect x) that best fit the 
intended (societal) purpose. Fourth, I suggest that the disciplinary perspective can and should be 
analyzed and evaluated, for which this Kuhnian framework is proposed. Therefore, the disciplinary 
perspective can be critically examined, for example, by revealing erroneous (e.g., empirically 
testable) assumptions, logical inconsistencies, and incoherencies between elements (i.e., between 
the aspects i-xi). Also, shortcomings of methods or knowledge used in the discipline may be pointed 
out, which can result into improvements of specific aspects in this list.39 In this manner, by critically 
analyzing the disciplinary perspective and also learning from other disciplines, scientific disciplines 
can evolve and become enriched, refined, and/or (more) adequate for (additional) epistemic tasks.  
 
7. Overview and Conclusions 
In Section 2, the semantic view of theories is interpreted as an epistemology of models. This leads to 
three important insights that come back throughout the article when explaining problematic aspects 
of scientific models.  
The first insight is that, to understand ‘how it is possible that models represent their target,’ it is 
crucial to presuppose (as the semantic view does) that models are non-linguistic entities, because this 
makes possible the comparison between models derived from abstract theories and data-models 
derived from experiments.40 Hence, due to the fact that models, according to the semantic view, are 
(non-linguistic) structures it is possible to easily compare them and to decide whether they are 
similar in the sense of being (partly) isomorphic. From a scientific practice point of view, therefore, 
the representational relationship between the model and its target would be more or less 
unproblematic if models were mere non-linguistic entities.  
 
39 For example, a discipline may newly incorporate methodologies, mathematical frameworks, scientific 
concepts, theories and measurement techniques taken from other disciplines (Boon and Van Baalen 2019). An 
example of the transfer of methods, and the theoretical frameworks and measurement techniques that 
accompany these methods, is traditional scientific practices such as biochemistry that have evolved into 
biotechnology and systems biology. The traditional practice typically used experimental methods to produce 
causal-mechanistic models, but at some point, these practices adopted mathematical methods, which provided 
new opportunities, including mathematical models of the same system that allow for different epistemic uses. 
 
40 In the philosophy of science, scientific models are usually interpreted as non-linguistic entities, that is, 
picture, graphs, diagrams or 3D-objects that ‘speak for themselves.’ In short, non-linguistic entities consist of 
images (e.g., of a phenomenon in the real-world that people can perceive by observing it), whereas linguistic 
entities consist of descriptions (e.g., of a phenomenon in the real-world that people grasp by reading the text). 
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The second insight is that the role of measurable variables is crucial for explaining how it is possible 
that a relationship can be established between a model and the real world. In the semantic view, the 
phenomenon that is imagined when deriving a model from the abstract theory is characterized in 
terms of measurable variables. In order to be comparable, the data-model that represents the real-
world phenomenon must be characterized by the same measurable variables. This is how a semantic 
connection between them can be established. Otherwise, no comparison between them would be 
possible. Therefore, the representational relationship between the model and the target-
phenomenon is based on representations in terms of measurable variables. Here as well, the 
representations being (non-linguistic) structures makes this relationship and comparison possible. 
The third insight is that models derived from abstract theory, only represents the imagined 
phenomenon as a model-outcome, for example at (physical-technological) conditions in the 
experimental set-up. Therefore, models as ‘direct’ or ‘literal’ representations of (purported) non-
observable phenomena is not an issue in the semantic view. 
 
Section 3 discusses in what sense the notion of models as independent epistemic entities differs from 
the notion of models in the semantic view. Morgan & Morrison (ed. 1999) have argued that scientific 
models are not always derived from theories, but also have a ‘life of their own.’ That is why they 
regard models as ‘autonomous epistemic entities,’ which is a view that I accept as more suitable for 
scientific practice. But this implies that the semantic view, although cogent, provides a too limited 
view of the epistemic roles of models in scientific practice.  
This requires rethinking how models represent. I explain why philosophical accounts that take 
scientific models as (more or less) literal representations prove to be problematic. This is particularly 
the case for models that represent purported (aspects of) real-world target-phenomena that cannot 
be perceived in a straightforward manner.41 Moreover, this also requires rethinking how it is possible 
to identify the phenomenon that is represented by the model, independent of that model. In 
addressing this, I conclude that an epistemology of scientific models also requires an epistemology of 
phenomena. 
 
Section 4 explores ideas about phenomena in the philosophy of science in order to get a grip on the 
question how it is possible that scientific models represent non-observable target-phenomena. Here, 
the key-issue is how we get to know the real-world phenomenon that is represented by the model. 
First, I refer back to the concept of phenomenon in the semantic view in which this concept seems 
unproblematic. In part, this is because phenomena are assumed non-linguistic observable entities 
(i.e., structures in terms of measurable variables).  
I then show that there are various interdependent issues that make both the concept of 
phenomenon, and the idea that models represent phenomena, rather blurry. Van Fraassen (1980, 
2008) argues that phenomena are observable by definition, and denies unobservable phenomena. 
Bogen & Woodward (1989) aimed at a richer concept that agrees better to notions of phenomena in 
scientific practice. They assume that most phenomena are not observable in a straightforward 
manner. However, the distinction between data and phenomena proposed by them runs into trouble 
when they aim to avoid that phenomena are ‘low-level’ theories by assuming that phenomena are 
 
41 In this article, real-world target-phenomena that cannot be perceived in a straightforward manner are called 
‘purported non-observable real-world target-phenomena.’ Focus is on physical or physical-technological real-
world target-phenomena, but in some of the examples, I also refer to social phenomena. 
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(derived from) patterns in data. As a consequence, their approach returns to the notion of 
phenomena in the semantic view. Still another idea about phenomena and their role in scientific 
practice is that phenomena are real-world things or occurrences that arouse our interest and ask for 
an explanation (Hacking, 1983). In this view, scientific research starts with observed phenomena, 
rather than theories or data, and seeks to find explanations for these phenomena. This is an 
important addition, because research practices that target practical problems often start from 
thinking about phenomena. These can be phenomena observed in nature or produced in a 
laboratory. Moreover, the point of departure in a research project may also be non-observable 
phenomena that are postulated to explain observable phenomena.42  
The issue raised by pointing out the different roles of phenomena in scientific practice is that 
scientific models represent the target-phenomenon not only in the sense of a (‘literal’) description or 
picture, but also in the sense of presenting an explanation for the phenomena. In the latter case, the 
scientific model that explains an observable target-phenomenon1 supposedly represents a non-
observable phenomenon2. 
Based on this exploration of ideas about phenomena, it becomes obvious that phenomena, as 
objects of study in scientific practice, do not appear to researchers as 'ready-made' entities (Massimi 
2007, 2008, 2011). Someone cannot simply point at a phenomenon and then photograph or draw or 
describe it. Instead, researchers inescapably use (theoretical) concepts to identify and conceptualize 
a phenomenon, usually within their own disciplinary perspective. The idea of 'scientific models as 
literal representations of target-phenomena’ is therefore misleading. It wrongly suggests that 
researchers first point at a phenomenon, and then represent it – where this representation is the 
model. Altogether, I conclude that usually it is not possible to identify a phenomenon independent of 
any conceptual, theoretical or mathematical framework. This also implies that the identification of 
the target-phenomenon (be it ‘observable’ or ‘non-observable’) must be understood as an inherent 
aspect of modelling it (as explained in Section 5). Furthermore, the way in which that is done is 
guided and restricted by the disciplinary perspective (Section 6). 
 
Section 5 argues that avoiding the picture-metaphor (i.e., the assumption of a similarity relationship 
between model and target) raises a number of philosophical issues (a-f) that an epistemology of 
models needs to address, and suggests that dealing with these issues requires taking into account 
the construction of models instead of starting from ready-made models. A recently published 
method for (re)constructing scientific models (Boon 2020) is taken as an example for this purpose 
(see note 19). According to this method, models initially form hubs in which heterogeneous aspects 
are brought together and integrated into a coherent whole. This account of how scientific models are 
constructed agrees with various of the insights developed in the present article. In particular, the 
method assumes that the construction of a scientific model involves the identification and 
conceptual articulation of the (imagined) target-phenomenon. Furthermore, the method requires 
specifying the physical or technological conditions that are considered relevant to the target-
 
42 Research could also aim at phenomena that do not even exist yet, but that are thought to serve some 
practical purpose. An example concerns the practical socio-technological problem of carbon dioxide emission in 
the production of electrical energy. An imagined solution is to harvest sun-light through artificial 
photosynthesis for the production of electrical energy. “harvesting sun-light etc.” and “artificial 
photosynthesis” are examples of phenomena of interest. So far, they are imagined phenomena, and scientific 
research aims at knowledge to actually create them. Research in the engineering sciences thus results in 
scientific models of the imagined phenomena. These models must be such that they make it possible to 
actually create the imagined phenomena with technological means (Boon 2017). 
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phenomenon, together with the measurable variables that characterize it, which complies with the 
proposed explanation of how the imagined phenomenon is connected with the real-world 
phenomenon.  
It is explored how the construction of models according to this method of construction sheds light on 
the philosophical issues (a-f) relevant for an epistemology of scientific models, based on which 
several conclusions can be drawn: (1) The method of construction shows that scientific models are 
not somehow read from reality (like a photograph or drawing). (2) The insight that constructing a 
model involves combining heterogeneous aspects makes it clear that both non-linguistic and 
conceptually meaningful linguistic content is selected and built into the model. This implies that the 
scientific model is not merely a (non-linguistic) picture or graph or set of mathematical equations 
that somehow literally represents the (objective) structure of a real-world target-phenomenon. 
Instead, the model is more like a coherent story that contains linguistic and non-linguistic content 
presented in, for example, a scientific article. Moreover, the way a scientific model is constructed 
depends on contextual information, which is related to the specificities of the discipline and to the 
epistemic purpose of the research project. Therefore, it makes sense to assume that a scientific 
article in its entirety presents the scientific model. (3) The method of construction explains how it is 
possible to connect between the model and the purported non-observable real-world phenomenon. 
This accords with my take on the semantic view in which the role of measurable variables is critical. 
However, the conceptual articulation of the phenomenon is also crucial, in particular to enable 
different types of inferential reasoning by means of the model. This requires to also explain how 
conceptually meaningful content enters the model. (4) In Section 4 it is argued that the target-
phenomenon is not ‘ready-made,’ but requires conceptual articulation. In line with this insight, 
Section 5 explains that, according to the method of construction, the identification of the 
phenomenon is an inherent part of the construction process. The conception of the target-
phenomenon (i.e., the imagined phenomenon) and the model are therefore co-constructed. For 
example, the construction of a model starts with observations, experiences, or data that a researcher 
wants to deal with, and is often also related to a broader (practical or theoretical) problem. In 
conceptual articulation, these observations, experiences, or data are brought under (scientific) 
concepts (i.e., ‘subsumption under concepts’). This is one way how conceptual content enters the 
model. (5) The method of construction explains how a model is justified. I distinguish three ways that 
complement each other. First, there is the comparison between model outcomes and experimental 
data (as in the semantic view). But it must also be assessed whether the model meets relevant 
epistemic and pragmatic criteria. ‘Internal coherence,’ for example, warrants that the model enables 
inferential reasoning. In addition, the construction of a model requires that the choices and decisions 
that are made with regard to the various elements built into the model be justified. (6) Lastly, 
therefore, it is argued that an epistemology of scientific models should also explain and justify the 
choices and decisions from researchers on aspects that must be built into the model. Moreover, 
researchers need to somehow interpret empirical and experimental findings (e.g., subsumption 
under concepts to imagine the target-phenomenon), for which intellectual capabilities of researchers 
are crucial, such as imagination.43 Therefore, in accordance with the transcendental and pragmatic 
 
43 The role of imagination introduced here goes beyond its role in the idea of models as fiction, as in 
Barberousse & Ludwig (2008), who investigate what it means to say that ‘models are fictions,’ and claim that 
the role of models in scientific practice lies in the activity of imagining. According to them, models are artifacts 
that enable researchers to play and experiment with ideas. In part, I agree with their idea in the sense that 
their notion of imagination is more or less synonymous with the notion of inferential reasoning that I use. But, 
by interpreting models as fictions, they avoid the philosophical premise that models must be understood 
primarily in terms of a putative referential relationship between the model and the purported ‘real-world’ 
phenomenon. In contrast, I aim at an epistemology of models that also explains how models make inferential 
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approach adopted here, an epistemology of models requires further clarification as to how the 
choices, decisions and conceptualizations by researchers are made possible. To explain this in more 
depth, I claim that the construction of scientific models is enabled and guided, but also restricted, by 
the disciplinary perspective within which researchers work. Section 5, “Taking Stock” summarizes the 
aspects of an epistemology of scientific models in a number of statements. 
The second part of this article concerns the role of (disciplinary) perspectives in developing an 
epistemology of models. The approach is again transcendental and pragmatic. I side with Massimi & 
McCoy (eds. 2020, 4) who state that: “[U]ltimately it does not matter how one defines the notion of 
“scientific perspective” (e.g., à la Giere, or à la van Fraassen, among others; with reference to 
scientific models, Kuhnian paradigms, or concepts and conceptual schemes). What matters most is 
what perspectivism can achieve, how it enters the practice of science, the challenges it poses, and 
the solutions it offers.” Nonetheless, I take it that it needs to be explained why we need disciplinary 
perspectives in an epistemology of scientific models. According to Massimi and McCoy, the practice 
orientation stresses the human point of view and therefore the role of perspectives. Similarly, my 
philosophical argument for defending the indispensable role of perspectives is based on the 
conclusion that the philosophically problematic representational relationship between model and 
target, and issues that arise from giving up the picture-metaphor of representation, must be clarified 
by explaining how it is possible that researchers construct scientific models, and how it is possible 
that these models can be used for inferential reasoning in performing epistemic tasks. 
Section 6, therefore, explains the epistemological and pragmatic roles of (disciplinary) perspectives in 
the construction of scientific models. It starts from asking: What are perspectives, and why do we 
need them? First, I argue that this is because perspectives in the broad sense enable and constrain 
the epistemic activities of researchers when constructing and using scientific models. Building on 
Giere’s (2006) work on perspectives in science, I distinguish five types of perspectives and explain 
their roles with regard of the issues addressed in the first part of this article. Then, I suggest that 
these different types of perspectives are part of the disciplinary perspective of a discipline. Next, I 
propose a Kuhnian framework for characterizing disciplinary perspectives in the form of a preliminary 
scheme that lists elements typically included in disciplinary perspectives. In short, the Kuhnian 
framework consists of a coherent set of heterogeneous elements, which includes the types of 
problems, phenomena, fundamental and ontological beliefs, measurement techniques, experimental 
procedures, mathematical, theoretical and conceptual frameworks, investigative strategies, and 
representational means that are typical of the discipline. The elements in the Kuhnian framework 
partly reflect those in the method for constructing models. This coherence explains why disciplinary 
perspectives understood in this way make the (discipline-specific) construction of scientific models 
possible and also limit it. 
Finally, it needs to be explained how to deal with cherished values such as objectivity, which in more 
traditional views of science requires “a view from nowhere” (Massimi and McCoy, eds., 2020, 2). 
Objectivity seems to require that knowledge is not constructed through perspectives. I defend that 
disciplinary perspectives are indispensable for the construction of models These contributions from 
researchers are indelibly built into the resulting scientific model and makes it ‘discipline-specific,’ 
rather than objective. To deal with this challenging issue and prevent harmful subjectivism, my 
suggestion is that in scientific research, disciplinary perspectives can and should be made explicit and 
critically evaluated, for which the Kuhnian framework proposed here may prove helpful.  
 
reasoning about the real-world phenomena possible. In addition, I stress that imagination plays a role in the 
construction of models and the conception of phenomena. 
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